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THE REQUIREMENT OF DOMESTIC
PARTICIPATION IN NEW MINING VENTURES
IN ZAMBIA
Muna Ndulo*
The Mines and Minerals Act' makes domestic participation a
mandatory pre-condition for the establishment of any mining enter-
prise by a foreign investor, and the law fixes the conditions of the
requisite domestic capital participation. This Article looks at the
background of this policy decision, the terms of participation, the
objectives of the policy, and the state's prospects of realising these
objectives in practice.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE POLICY
The policy of requiring participation was announced in 1969 and
was subsequently incorporated into the Mines and Minerals Act in
the same year. It is not a novel provision in the context of the history
of mining activities in Zambia. In the early period of mining in
Zambia the British South Africa Company required two-thirds of
every registered mining location to be held by the registered holders
on joint account and one-third by the British South Africa Com-
pany.3 It exercised this interest at the time formal permission was
requested to work for profit.'
The Zambian government, following the attainment of independ-
ence in 1964, virtually confined itself to an increase in tax revenues
obtained from the mining companies by demanding that the exist-
ing companies Zambianise mining posts at all levels as rapidly as
possible.5 This was despite a 1963 United Nations Economic Com-
* Acting Dean, Unza School of Law, Lusaka, Zambia; LL.B., Zambia, 1970; LL.M., Har-
vard, 1971; D. Phil. Oxon, 1976.
Mines and Minerals Act, 1976, No. 33, § 20.
2 KAUNDA, TowARDs COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE 36 (1969).
See Letter from Secretary of the Company to the Colonial Secretary, May 5, 1911, C.O.
417-507. Later this could be substituted for royalty payments. See IMPERIAL INSTITUTE, THE
MINING LAWS OF THE BRrriSH EMPIRE AND OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES, NORTHERN RHODESIA 17
(1930).
1 The requirement was unpopular among miners who complained that it made it impossi-
ble to procure capital for many propositions which would otherwise attract capital by their
intrinsic merit, and that, where investors were prepared to invest their capital subject to the
condition, it resulted in an undue inflation of the capital and in consequent repetition of
mining propositions. See Letter of High Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, November
5, 1969, C.O. 417-424.
The year after independence, an export tax was introduced and the income tax rate was
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mission recommendation that in view of the significance of the in-
dustry in the economy of the country, the government should have
direct participation,' and also despite the fact that in 1964 the exist-
ing mining companies had offered the government minority partici-
pation in their mining ventures.7
The government's attitude can be attributed to the fact that soon
after independence there was general insecurity on the part of min-
ing companies and their workers. As a result, it did not want to take
measures which might have increased the insecurity.' And not un-
naturally, there was also lack of confidence on the part of govern-
ment in its own ability to manage such a large enterprise.
This policy change in 1969 was in fact largely due to the behaviour
of foreign firms in Zambia, both mining and non-mining. While in
1953-1963 the country was still a British protectorate and a member
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the tendency was for
secondary industry in the Federal Sector to be concentrated in
Southern Rhodesia, whereas the North remained a supplier of reve-
nue for the copper mining industry and a market for manufactured
goods." It was not only the Southern Rhodesian industries which
served Northern Rhodesia, but also those of South Africa. 0 The
major mining companies, for instance, were subsidiary companies
of South African mining houses. It had been the custom over many
years for the Zambian subsidiaries to be administered from the
South.
Most foreign firms, mining and non-mining, looked to South Af-
rica for supplies, and stock was brought up from Southern Rhodesia
or South Africa as needed. After the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Rhodesia the companies went on as before, although it
became increasingly contrary to government policy, especially as
Zambia responded to the United Nations call to impose sanctions
increased. See Copper Export Tax Act, 1966, and Taxes Charging and Amendment Act, 1965,
§ 19(2).
U.N.I.E.C.A./F.A.O., Economic Survey Mission of the Economic Development of Zam-
bia 39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.14/302 (1964) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Economic Survey].
Prain, Address to the National Affairs Association, Lusaka, 1964.
The government attributed its lack of action to the fact that the mines were too big. See
KAUNDA, ZAMBIA'S ECONOMIC REvOLTrrION 50 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KAUNDA].
I The scale on which this was done was massive and it is estimated that Zambia lost well
over 84 million Kwacha over the ten year period of federation (one Kwacha equals US $1.22
as of 1976). See U.N. Economic Survey, supra note 6, at 36.
"* In 1964 Southern Rhodesia supplied 39 percent of all imports and South Africa a further
21 percent. See CENTRAL AFRICAN RESEARCH - 4, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ZAMBIA'S NEW ECONOMIC
PROGRAMME 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CENrrAL AFRICAN REsEARCH - 4].
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on Rhodesia." She had also been committed to reducing her de-
pendence upon imports from South Africa. But many companies
appeared unwilling to seek alternative sources of supply of goods in
East Africa or elsewhere despite government requests. A marked
reluctance to set up genuine separate company structures in Zam-
bia was also apparent; indeed some branches had little more than
a nominal existence and were used to order imports from Britain
which were off-loaded en route to Rhodesia to circumvent sanc-
tions. 2
Allied to these economic consequences were political side effects.
Africans could find little opportunity to acquire managerial or tech-
nical expertise. During the colonial period it was impossible for
them to obtain loan capital on the terms granted to Europeans and
various legal restrictions prevented them from advancing beyond
certain levels. For example, until 1960 Africans were barred from
becoming apprentices. 3 Academic limitations were also severe; at
the time of independence, Zambia had only 960 Africans with school
certificates and less than 100 graduates." As a result, the mines were
staffed at senior levels totally by expatriates. In 1969, of the employ-
ees of the mining companies operating in the country, 40,000 were
Zambians (mostly unskilled) and about 7,000 expatriates were in
skilled jobs. On the board of the mining companies, there were two
Zambians, one indigenous Zambian and one expatriate who had
taken Zambian nationality. 15 Efforts to Zambianise in the five years
since independence had been largely unsuccessful," as shown in the
following chart.
11 Id. at 2; for example, coke from Wankie had to be replaced for mining use at great cost
with supplies from Germany. See Zambian Economic Survey, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT, October
1973, at 13.
11 Republic of Zambia, Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Tribunal on Detainees,
(1967). This report revealed many practices that were going on and showed that there was
general sympathy among the white population to Rhodesia's point of view.
,3 CENTRAL AFRICAN RESEARCH - 4, supra note 10, at 2.
" U.N. Economic Survey supra note 6, at 34.
" CENTRAL AFRICAN RESEARCH - 4, supra note 10, at 2.
The situation has not changed much with government participation in existing mines. Of
the over 30,224 workers, only 107 Zambians held senior staff position. See Nchanga Consoli-
dated Copper Mines Ltd., Annual Report (1974). And yet the government target was much
higher. See Zambianisation Committee Report Progress of Zambianisation (1972).
11 An official inquiry in 1966, however, found no reason to doubt the sincerity or good faith
of the companies with respect to their programmes for the training and promotion of Zambi-
ans, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE MINING INDUSTRY 73-74 (1966). But there
is a contrary view, e.g., M. BUROWAY, THE COLOUR OF CLASS ON THE COPPERBELT MINES: FROM
AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT TO ZAMBIANISATION (1972). The local employees seem to believe that
the companies are to blame. See Times of Zambia, Feb. 11, 1974, at 1.
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EXPATRIATE LABOUR STRENGTH IN MINING
INDUSTRY 17
(1965-1969)
Average Engage- Resig- Displaced by
Year Strength ments nations Zambianisation
1965 7,035 902 1,131 247
1966 5,981 1,213 1,403 360
1967 5,378 1,011 1,058 292
1968 4,845 1,088 1,124 178
1969 4,727 947 1,127 100
In the years 1964-1969, the Zambian economy expanded rapidly.
With the end of Federation, the return of control over the country's
revenue made possible a great increase in government spending.
Manufacturing developed at a fair pace and its contribution to the
gross domestic product rose significantly.'8 But this rapid expansion
was inevitably accompanied by inflationary pressures, and these
were made dangerous by the desire of some companies to extract
high profits from a relatively small capital investment. Some com-
panies committed the smallest possible paid up capital and ex-
ported most profits while relying extensively on local borrowing for
their projects. Quite apart from the fact that local borrowing is in
conflict with the interests of the host state, it also means there will
be less credit available for domestic entrepreneurs.
There was no exchange control for the first few years after inde-
pendence and the absolute freedom to export profits was used to the
fullest.'9 Some resident companies purchasing merchandise from
," MINING YEAR BOOK OF ZAMBIA, (1969). Most replacements of expatriates were in the
personnel divisions of the mining companies and not at operational levels; e.g., in 1965 there
were only 9 Zambian shift bosses out of 823. See PROSPECTS OF ZAMBIA MINING INDUSTRY 18
(1970).
11 The contribution of manufacturing to gross domestic product rose from L14,100,000 in
1964 to £30,000,000 in 1967 (from approximately 1977 US $24,250,000 to US $51,600,000). Its
volume rose by 25% per year on average, despite the limitations imposed by the Rhodesian
situation. See CENTRAL AFRICAN RESEARCH - 4, supra note 10, at 2.
"1 This led the government to limit the amount of dividends that could be externalized to
50% of profits. KAUNDA, supra note 8, at 7.
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parent organisations abroad added as much as a third on the cost
price when making payments. This allowed them to remove capital
at a still higher rate while at the same time increasing Zambia's cost
of living. This behaviour did much to whip up feeling against foreign
companies within the country. The major reason for the introduc-
tion of the policy of government participation is therefore to ensure
that mining right holders operate within the framework of the over-
all economic and social goals of the country.
The policy is also borne out of a desire to ensure that the mining
industry is not completely foreign owned and controlled-a desire
widespread among developing countries, particularly in relation to
extractive industries. 0 In these countries the ordinary man in the
street sees no value in theoretical political independence if most of
the decisions relating to employment, inflation, pricing, and basic
economic considerations which affect his ability to work and look
after himself and bring up his family are in the final analysis depen-
dent upon decisions made in other countries. The need for this
domestic involvement can best be understood when it is realised
that before 1969, there was no direct indigenous financial participa-
tion in mining activities as such, although some local capital had
been invested in the big mining companies, and there were a few
local companies exploiting minerals such as mica and limestone."
The policy was first implemented in 1968 with regard to nonmin-
ing activities." Two precedents for this policy could be seen in Zaire,
a neighbour and a fellow member of the International Copper Or-
ganisation, which had taken similar moves in relation to its mining
industry in 1966, as had Chile, another fellow member of the Copper
Conference.?
" This desire, though widespread among developing countries, is not confined to them.
Such rich countries as France and Canada have been concerned about the limitations on their
independence created by large scale American investments, and Britain is frequently worried
by the loss of freedom that arises out of running a reserve currency with inadequate backing.
Canada's concern has been so great that in 1973 the government passed the New Foreign
Investment Review Act which in clause 2 states: "This Act is enacted by the Parliament of
Canada in recognition by Parliament that the extent to which control of Canadian industry,
trade and commerce has become acquired by persons other than Canadians and the effect
thereof on the ability of Canadians to maintain effective control over their economic environ-
ment is a matter of national concern." Bill C-132, 1973, 1st Sess., 29th Parl., 21 Eliz. II. See
also Wahn, Towards Canadian Identity-The Significance of Foreign Investment, 11
OSGOOD. HALL L. J. 517 (1973).
" United Nations Secretariat, The Status of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth
and Resources 170, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 97/5/Rev. 2 (1962).
21 KAUNDA, supra note 8, at 11.
11 Members of the C.I.P.E.C. have undertaken to keep each other informed of important
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This desire for economic independence should be distinguished
from a desire to cut off all foreign investment. In fact, in the Second
National Development Plan one aspect of the government's mineral
policy is stated to be the creation of a favourable investment climate
in order to encourage the private sector to increase its level of inter-
est in exploiting the mineral potential of the country.24 It empha-
sises that legislation must always reflect this objective. There is a
general realisation of the need for foreign capital in the development
of the country's mineral resources. Throughout its history, the in-
dustry had been developed by foreign capital.25 In the early part it
was largely British, American, and South African capital which put
mining on a sound footing and to this day has a significant interest
in the existing mines, although now control rests in the state. And
even if foreign investment were not to take the form of financial
investment, at least in the beginning "know-how" would have to be
contracted from abroad and financing arranged by borrowing from
abroad if new mining projects were to be generated and successfully
realised. Because of these and other benefits, discussed later, which
the country derives from foreign capital, it does not wish to nation-
alise the mines completely.
II. THE TERMS OF PARTICIPATION
Various ways exist of enforcing domestic participation. One such
way, which has been adopted in Botswana, is for the government to
issue a certain percentage of all equity stock free of charge to itself.
Another, of which the operations of the government of Ghana in
relation to that country's gold and diamond mines provide one of
many examples, involves enunciating a policy that a certain propor-
tion of the equity of all major mining companies should be owned
by the government and then inviting the companies concerned to
enter negotiations with a view of giving effect to this policy.
developments in their own mining industries and cooperate in matters of mutual interest. For
instance, they sometimes cooperate on measures aimed at improving the price of copper, e.g.,
cutbacks on production. See Chairman's Statement, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines
Ltd. (1975).
24 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 91 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN]. See also Kaunda, in Industrial and Mining Corpo-
ration Ltd., Annual Report (1974).
25 Basic sources on the history of the industry include, K. BRADLEY, COPPER VENTURE
(1952); J. BANCROFT, MINING IN NORTHERN RHODESIA: A CHRONICLE OF MINERAL EXPLORATION
AND MINING DEVELOPMENT (1961); F. COLEMAN, THE NORTHERN RHODESIA COPPERBELT 1899-
1962: TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT UP TO THE END OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION (1971).
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The Zambian mining legislation follows neither of the above two
but instead legislates a government option to participate up to the
extent of 51% of the equity shares on terms fixed by it. This option
is in practice held by the Mines Industrial Development Corpora-
tion whose issued capital is held 100% by the state. This condition
is imposed by section 20 of the Mines and Minerals Act, and the
granting of a prospecting license is made dependent on the appli-
cant agreeing to this condition being included in the license. So far
all prospecting licenses that have been issued have carried this con-
dition, and no license has been refused on the grounds that the
applicant does not wish this condition to be included. The relevant
part of the section reads as follows:
An application for a prospecting license may be granted subject to
conditions, including, in particular (a) a condition requiring the
applicant to agree to the Republic, or any person nominated on
behalf of the Republic, having an option to acquire an interest in
any mining venture which might be carried on by the applicant or
by any person to whom he transfers his mining right, in the pro-
posed prospecting area.2
A. The Decision to Participate
The state does not have to participate, and has in fact refused
participation in one case, 27 although the case in point is not a very
good example of the government's nonexercise of the option, since
it was an existing mine, and the mine was operating at a loss. It may
also indicate that the state will not exercise its option in the case of
projects of doubtful viability. It makes a decision whether to partici-
pate or not and the extent to which it will participate within the
limits of 51%. It may also ask another investor to participate on its
behalf.
The procedure for the implementation of the policy where a con-
dition as to participation has been included in a prospecting license,
or carried over into an exploitation license is that, prior to applying
for a mining license, the holder must notify the state and the holder
of the option that he intends to apply for a mining license and
28 This is carried on in the exploration license under § 31(1)(g), which provides that "[an
applicant for an exploration license may be rejected where the applicant is unable or unwill-
ing to comply with any terms or conditions on which the relevant prospecting license was
granted and which are applicable to the granting of the exploration license." Mines and
Minerals Act, 1976, No. 33, § 31(1)(g).
" This is the case of Mkushi Copper Ltd.
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requires the holder to exercise his option. 21 An application for a
mining license may only be granted if the holder of the option exer-
cises the option or informs the holder of the license in writing that
the option will not be exercised or fails to act within six months of
being required to exercise his option.29
Should the option not be exercised at the time of the grant of the
mining license, it is not exercised thereafter except upon the invita-
tion of the mining right holder. This stipulation appears in an an-
nexure attached to prospecting licenses. The provision is generally
interpreted by miners and mining officials as meaning that once the
government does not exercise its option at this time the mining right
holder can operate without any fear of government participation as
any such measure would be a breach of the prospecting license. Any
other interpretation would be contrary to the concept of vested
rights, which is an essential element in the encouragement of min-
ing investment, in that it would be eroded if negotiations relating
to participation by government or its nominees were to take place
after the issue of prospecting or exploration licenses.
B. Government Participation in Prospecting
The state's policy at the moment is that, as far as possible, pros-
pecting in all fields should be -by the private sector and that pros-
pecting by the government or a para-statal group should only be
undertaken when there is no probability of activity by the private
sector.30 This attempts to rule out the possibility of domestic partici-
pation in the earlier stages of mining activity.
The stage at which the state decides to take an interest is re-
garded as a disincentive by many mining right holders, in that the
high risk part of mining is left to private companies. In the initial
stages of prospecting and exploration there is a relatively low capital
requirement but a very high risk element. This gradually changes
as a project matures until at the time of the exploitation of a mineral
deposit there is a very high capital investment, and the risk factor
has been reduced to a minimum level. It also means in practice that
domestic capital jumps on the bandwagon of the winner but not on
Mines and Minerals Act, 1976, No. 33 § 46(19)(b).
Notification takes the form of a notice which states the percentage of the ordinary shares
in the company to be acquired and signed on behalf of the government and sent by registered
post to the resigtered office of the company. Notification is given, where the option is held
by any person on behalf of the Republic, to that person, and, where it is held by the state, to
the Minister of Mines.
*" SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 24, at 91.
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that of the losers-in that if a firm spends K8,000 on finding miner-
als, it may then have to give 51% of its shares to the state, whereas
if a firm loses K8,000 in trying to find minerals and finds none, the
state will not be interested in its ventures and it will have to bear
the loss alone.
It is understandable that the state should insist on minimising the
use of its funds in the high-risk period, as it would be difficult to
justify, in a poor country, the expenditure of much-needed public
revenue for what is to the public eye seemingly unproductive activi-
ties in the short-term, save in exceptional circumstances where
prospecting has virtually dried up; which is not the case in Zam-
bia .3 Besides if government participates at low levels without tech-
nical back-up, it is not very helpful.
Moreover, it is not exactly true to state that when the government
does not participate in prospecting directly it contributes nothing,
since it in fact contributes indirectly in several ways. When a com-
pany is prospecting, although on the debit side it has risk and the
amount of its investment, it has on the credit side the mineral to
be discovered, limited infrastructural costs, general social and edu-
cational costs, and its use free of charge of the basic geoscientific
data compiled by the Geological Survey Department. The actual
contribution of the government in respect of the last item alone can
usually be as high as 10% of the expenditure incurred by the pro-
spector in a normal prospecting programme.32
But perhaps there is a need to re-examine this policy in the light
of the need to improve the mining investment climate and in the
light of better resource utilisation and the realisation that, with the
acquisition by government of the natural resources in its country,
the long-term goals are now much more significant than the short-
term ones. The development of a logical minerals policy and ra-
tional mineral resources management becomes increasingly signifi-
cant.
Since the cost of the shares can be either in case or properties, the
state could modify its policy by, for instance, building the infras-
tructure where it does not exist and using this to earn a proportion-
ate equity share. One advantage would be that it would be spending
3' For instance it is expected that the production of copper will increase by 39.5 percent
from 645,300 metric tons in 1971 to 900,000 tons in 1976, which gives a 6.8 percent average
annual rate of growth for 1972-1976 as compared with 0.6 percent for the 1969-1971 period.
SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 24, at 91.
32 See WOAKES, SOME PERSONAL NOTES ON THE MINING INDUSTRY IN ZAMBIA (1972).
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money on non-risk factors which are also of some use to other
spheres of the economy. The setting up of a mining investment fund
should also be considered, whose aim should be the promotion and
development of mineral exploration. The fund could be owned
jointly by the government and private mining interests. Its funds
could be lent to miners to finance minerals development on a loan
basis at reasonable rates of interest, particularly for programmes of
prospecting and exploration. Increasingly there should be a move by
the state away from simply taking over existing properties to creat-
ing new instruments and tools for achieving minerals development.
Indeed the state seems to have modified its policy in practice in
some cases to take account of the complaints by miners as evidenced
by two recent participation agreements. These two new ventures
had been formed before the stage of mining had been reached. Mo-
kambo Development Company was established as a joint venture
between Mines Industrial Development Corporation and Geomin of
Rumania.33 The company, incorporated in May 1974, is undertak-
ing geological and mineral investigations into the Mokambo copper
ore body situated near the Zambia-Zaire border. Secondly, there is
Mines Development Corporation-Noranda, which was formed be-
tween the state corporation and Noranda Mines Limited of Can-
ada. 34 The company, incorporated on 29 July 1974, is undertaking
mineral prospecting in five license areas in Central, Copperbelt, and
North-Western provinces. Mines Industrial Development Corpora-
tion is carrying out its own prospecting on a small scale through its
prospecting wing, Mindex.
C. Payment for the Government Interest
Unless otherwise agreed to by the government and the holder of
the mining right, the consideration for the interest for which the
option is exercised is payable in cash to the holder (if shares are
transferred by the holder) or to the company (if shares are issued
by the company). In the first case the cash paid has to be a sum
equal to such proportion of all expenditure reasonably incurred by
prospecting, exploration, development, relevant evaluation, metal-
lurgical test work, and feasibility studies in or in relation to the
prospecting area, as well as a reasonable proportion of overhead and
general administrative expenses in cases where the holder or his
"' MINES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, [1974] ZAMBIA MINING YEAR BOOK 11.
34 Id.
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predecessors in title have held mining rights for other areas in Zam-
bia.
The expenses, however, have to be those incurred by the holder
of the mining right or his predecessors in title from the date of issue
of the prospecting license under the Act to the date of the exercise
of the option as may be equal to such interest (not exceeding 51%
thereof) as the state may decide to acquire in the mining company."
In the second case the cash paid is to be ascertained by reference to
the following formula:
x = yz
100-z
where x equals the amount to be subscribed, y equals the total of
the said expenditure, and z equals the percentage interest nomi-
nated by the government.
The expenditure must be reflected in annual accounts certified by
a firm of independent accountants acceptable to the government,
and the accounting year relating thereto shall be agreed upon by the
holder of the mining right with the government, whereupon the
accounts are to be produced for the government within three months
after the end of such agreed year.
It is important that the government pay for its shares in a fair
form, if its action is not to frighten away other mining investors. On
the basis of the formula above, the state agrees to pay for its share
of prospecting and development, carried out in the whole of the
original prospecting area in which the new mine is found, and to pay
for mine construction expenditure on the same terms as other share-
holders. Although, of course, for all the original prospector's outlay
on prospecting, he ends up getting only half a mine instead of a
whole mine, the only loss he incurs is the interest and reward for risk
on the prospecting expenditure.
A problem has arisen at times with regard to exploration expen-
ses. Where a company finds minerals, does the state on acquiring
an interest pay exploration expenses for the whole license or only for
those expenses that can be said to be related to the mineral to be
mined? Such was the case in the Lumwana license area, where there
was a dispute as to whether the state was to pay for investigations
of uranium when the mine in which it was to participate was going
to be one for copper. The state refused to pay the exploration expen-
1 See Annexure attached to prospecting licenses.
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ses for uranium. This problem may not easily arise with respect to
prospecting because at that stage the mining right holder is investi-
gating mineral occurrences generally, whereas at the exploration
stage specific ore bodies are investigated.
This issue really arises out of the problem already discussed, that
of the state's non-involvement in the high-risk stages of mining. The
government's decision concerning Lumwana was consistent with its
declared policy. And the payment for exploration expenses by the
state of minerals not being mined would be unjustified in that the
state would be reimbursing the wealthier miners, in so far as such
a miner would have had some results for his expenses, whereas, it
does not reimburse miners whose prospecting programmes produce
no results.
In so far as this practice is a disincentive to the attainment of an
increased level of prospecting, the cost to the prospector could be
mitigated if a company wishing to utilise data could pay something,
and also by the suggestion earlier in this section for the establish-
ment of a mining fund, so that some of the money for prospecting
might be obtained at a reasonable rate of interest. Moreover, it must
be realised that in the end the company recovers the money when
it starts to mine for profit, as the tax law allows for such expenditure
to be recovered as is discussed later.
Upon the payment of the government part in the expenses, as
calculated according to the formula outlined above, the government
requires the mining right holder to make available to the govern-
ment, free of all encumbrances, such number of the issued ordinary
voting shares in the capital of the mining company being formed as
represents the percentage of voting rights in the whole of the issued
share capital of the company equal to the percentage of the interest
in the mining company for which the option is exercised. A new
mining company has to be formed with itself and the private inves-
tor as the sole shareholders in the new company.
There is usually no difficulty in valuing the shares to be acquired
by the state. The value of the shares is usually taken to be the
estimated value of the investment. There is no difficulty largely
because the circumstances in this case are different from those pre-
vailing in an on-going mining venture. In an on-going concern a
government is usually mindful of the historical cost of the project
and the write-offs that have been allowed, as was the case in 1969
when the state acquired a majority interest in the existing mines.
A company running an existing mine will be mainly concerned with
its current and future cash flow from a project, as was the case with
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the pre-1969 mining companies. In such cases the state tends to
discount the reward due to the investor for originally finding a de-
posit and for taking the risk of bringing it into production. In doing
so, it is usually influenced by high levels of past profits earned by
the projects.
Participation in new mining projects is a different matter. In this
situation the participation required by the state is in a sense part
of the price a company is paying for its mining right. It is directly
analogous to a tax on distributable profits. To the mining right
holder the financial aspect of participation is more or less just a new
form of taxation. 3 The investor is interested in his net return on the
money he puts into a project. When he does his calculations before
making his investment decision or before determining whether to
continue with a project, he estimates the profit he will make, and
then deducts the various taxes he has to pay, thus arriving at his
after-tax profit. If there is participation by the state, he must then
also deduct the dividend he has to pay to the state as shareholder.
This gives him his true net profit. Of course he also has to allow for
the fact that the government contributes to expenditures on invest-
ment once the state has decided to participate.
Ill. OBJECTIVES FOR THE STATE AND THE REACTION OF MINING RIGHT
HOLDERS
The country aims to derive from this policy of co-ownership the
well-known advantages of local equity participation in foreign ven-
tures in developing countries as cited by several writers on foreign
investment. 38
A. Objectives of the State
Government participation reduces deeply ingrained suspicions of
foreign economic domination. This is particularly important in min-
ing operations because usually their size is large in comparison with
other industries. Whether such suspicions are justified in a particu-
1 In the negotiations leading to the settlement over the 1969 nationalisation there were
differences of opinion as to how much compensation was sufficient. See A. MARTIN, MINDING
THEIR OWN BUSINESS: ZAMBIA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST WESTERN CONTROL 176 (1972).
31 The joint company will pay a mineral tax of 51% of the pre-tax profits in the case of a
copper mine, as well as a company tax-currently 45% of the balance of the pre-tax prof-
its-though neither tax is payable until all the pre-production costs have been offset, i.e., all
capital expenditure is immediately deductable. See Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines
Ltd., Annual Report 9 (1974).
31 FRIEDMANN & BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMANN & BEGUIN].
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lar case or not, they have been recognised to be a real and an impor-
tant aspect of that national sensitivity which characterizes many
emancipated peoples who were formerly held in a state of political
and economic dependency.
It stimulates the engagement of responsible local capital in pro-
ductive enterprises where the option is exercised in favour of a local
company." It may even help to develop a nucleus of experienced
managerial personnel in the public and private sectors in proportion
to the participation of public authorities and private capital in joint
ventures, in that local labour becomes directly involved in the in-
dustry through the equity participation. This in fact has been the
result in the other spheres of the economy where the state has par-
ticipated. These companies have made the deliberate choice of hir-
ing local talent, which has paid off in the sense that several former
employees of the state-owned companies have gone into business for
themselves, providing an indirect benefit to the economy. In addi-
tion to the skills which the inhabitants of the country acquire from
employment in these enterprises, equity participation is also simply
a mechanism for the transfer of technology from the developed
countries.
But the overriding consideration for this policy is control of min-
ing activities so that they operate within the overall economic and
social policy of the country. There are many areas of conflict be-
tween the state and the mining right holders in their mining opera-
tions; one was the rate of development in the 1960's, when the
mining right holders were keeping the minerals in the ground while
the state was concerned with increasing the speed of extraction.
Another major area of conflict which has often emerged is the use
to which investable resources should be put. In the past, for in-
stance, the miners have wanted the reinvestible profits confined to
mining activities whereas the state wanted them applied to other
spheres of the economy. There is also the problem of how much of
the profits should be reinvested at all.
Sometimes the conflicts arise because of conflict of interest be-
tween the state and the mining companies. A case in point arose
over the use of "formed coke" in processing lead and zinc at Broken
Hill mine. The government, mindful of its obligations to the inter-
national community in relation to sanctions against the Rhodesian
, Id.
,0 NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12
(1965) [hereinafter cited as NWOGUGU].
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regime, proposed that Waelz Kilns should be constructed to produce
"coke" locally. This, it was anticipated, could prolong the life of
Broken Hill mine by eight years, since the reserves were diminish-
ing. The process cost approximately K70 to produce a ton of coke,
whereas the cost of importing a ton of coke from the Rhodesian
Wankie coal mines was about K27 per ton. Anglo-American Corpo-
ration Ltd., favoured leaving the Wankie market still open. In the
first place they argued that it was cheaper to do so, but at the same
time one must remember that the Anglo-American Corporation Ltd.
owns equity interests in the Wankie Collieries.
There are conflicts about sources of equipment and other re-
sources. The state, mindful of its duty to develop the country, would
prefer local sources even if it means a small sacrifice in performance
whereas the mining right holders tend to insist on the best and
cheapest sources of supply. This was the problem over the develop-
ment and the exploitation of Zambia's coal resources for use in the
mining industry. Although the problem was also partly due to the
fact that the coal was not as good in quality as the Wankie coal.
In theory, participation of domestic capital in foreign enterprises
is acknowledged to have positive advantages in the possibility of fair
policy decisions by the enterprise, because government directors
sitting on the board are in a better position to scrutinize the activi-
ties of the business and to deduce its intentions correctly than would
be an external group of officials to whom the miners might otherwise
have to report.
The state has financial interests also by way of participation. Its
equity participation in the existing mines has proved to have overall
benefits in the area of profits in that it has effectively increased
government revenues from mining activities." It has also reduced
the concern that any immediate benefit to the balance of payments
arising from the inflow of foreign capital would be more than offset
in the long run by the outflow of dividends. The burden of dividend
transfers and repatriation of foreign capital is thereby reduced,
while still achieving the gains in acquisition of techniques and man-
agement skills, as well as in industrial activity, that a solo venture
would have provided.
State participation also gives the state an opportunity to control
the extent to which companies allow their parent bodies to profit
1 In 1974 quite apart from its tax receipts a dividend of K43.2 million was declared by the
holding company to the state. See Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation Ltd., Directors'
Report, (1974).
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from their subsidiaries. This in certain circumstances is important
particularly with regard to the fact that most of the mining compa-
nies operating in Zambia are worldwide. It has been established
that multinational corporations develop a planned and global strat-
egy in their foreign operations and that sometimes, through transfer
of products within a vertically integrated company, the prices which
are used for these transfers are a major avenue for a subsidiary to
receive or transmit financial resources to another subsidiary or to
the head office. Participation affords the government directors an
opportunity to scrutinize purchasing and marketing arrangements,
the fees for provision of technical and consultancy services, and
investment of surplus funds, all of which can be used by companies
to make hidden or disguised profits outside the host country.
B. Reaction of Miners to Government Participation
There has been a change in attitudes from ten years ago; so much
so that now there is no doubt that the great majority of mining right
holders within the country welcome and are prepared to undertake
joint ventures with the government42 in mine development and ex-
ploration, although given a choice they would prefer minority rather
than majority participation. So far there has not been any case in
which mining capital has had to withdraw because of the govern-
ment's insistence on acquiring equity in a new mining venture, and
there are no mines that have been discovered but are not in produc-
tion because of this policy.
In some cases the mining right holders consider that there is an
absolute business advantage in the association of the state with
their enterprise. They may be short of capital, as in the case of
Mkushi Copper Mines, which several times invited government to
take an interest in it as a solution to its liquidity problems. 3
Also the country presents certain political and economic risks,
" Mr. Oppenheimer has recently given some indication of the thinking of his group, the
Anglo-American Corporation. In the course of his Statement to Shareholders at the 1974
Annual General Meeting he said:
No government likes its basic industries to be entirely foreign owned and yet in
many developing countries individual members of the public either do not have the
resources to invest in industry or, for ideological reasons are prevented from doing
so. The only alternative in such cases to full foreign ownership is for government
to take a direct interest. In these circumstances we willingly accept a partnership
between the government as owners of the mineral rights and private companies that
can provide the necessary financial resources and technical know how.
But see note 57 infra.
1' Mkushi Mine has since closed. Mining Mirror, October 3, 1975, at 7.
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such as nationalisation, devaluation, foreign exchange blockage,
depreciating currency, and excessive taxation, so that some mining
right holders are often willing to accept domestic participation in
order to reduce the financial risk involved in mining investment.
Their reaction to risk is to ask themselves whether the company is
able to absorb a possible loss before proceeding and then inquire
into the possibilities of diminishing its exposure to risk. This was
partly the reason why Anglo-American Corporation Ltd. and Roan
Selection Trust Ltd. in the early 1960's invited the state to take
minority interest in their mining activities. Financially, they could
have gone on their own without difficulty.
More recently this attitude is particularly noticeable in the new
companies anyway; the larger the capacity for investment in rela-
tion to the amount of the pre-discovery investment, the better able
the company is to absorb a possible loss. It must be realised that
new mines are expensive to bring into production. For instance, any
investment in exploration must be backed by a determination to
follow up, by further investments of ever-increasing amounts, the
indications proved by initial prospecting efforts.
An example of this is that an aerial geophysical survey generally
requires an additional expenditure on the order of ten times its
costs, on follow-up checking of indications provided by the survey.
Thus an investment of K1 million on a large aerial survey will re-
quire an investment of an additional K10 million for follow-up on
the ground, and unless these follow-up works are carried out the
purpose of conducting the survey is negated. The follow-up will in
turn lead to the development of one or more mines involving the
expenditure of millions of Kwacha.
One way of reducing the impact of risk is by reducing the amount
of capital invested. From this point of view, the availability of gov-
ernment or any other local currency loans is a very important incen-
tive, in that it minimises the amount of equity capital commited by
the mining company and therefore reduces the impact of risk. There
is a good example in the case of the Lumwana prospecting area
which is supposed to come into production in two to three years
time. The prospecting was done jointly by Anglo-American Corpo-
ration and Amax, the prospecting wing of Roan Selection Trust Ltd.
When they reached the stage of exploration the two companies indi-
cated that they would not go on unless the state joined them. Al-
though it contains one of the largest ore bodies-Lumwana has very
low copper content-the state has decided to join the companies
anyway. Anglo-American Corporation Ltd., seems to be coming to
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nearly the same position over the recently discovered nickel deposits
in its Maunali prospecting area; the company seems to be particu-
larly worried over infrastructure costs.
Other positive benefits derived from such associations by the min-
ing companies are that local voting control causes the state to feel
a greater sense of responsibility for the success of the enterprise. For
some it provides ready access to know-how, manpower, and knowl-
edge of the geology of the country. The government, through its
Geological Survey Department, has the most complete information
about the geology of the country.
Writers on foreign investment recognise that a joint enterprise
provides a bulwark against government interference or greater gov-
ernment participation," in that the state will be more reluctant to
impose profit restrictions, import controls, or even expropriation
measures where local investors or the government itself is involved.
And that participation in most cases sufficiently satisfies nationalis-
tic aspirations to forestall any need for greater participation by the
government itself by deflecting harmful emotional charges which
the foreign venture may attract when it is big and successful and
still remains completely foreign.
State participation provides a helpful liaison with local govern-
ment authorities and financial institutions as the local officials,
particularly the directors, are able to influence government action
by private negotiations with government officials and politicians.
This is especially true in a small country such as Zambia, where the
limited population means that the individuals sharing power will
often have much of their life experience in common. It is true that
the foreign officials can do the same, but the function is better
performed by local partners than by the investor company because
they know the local situation better. In any case it is obvious that
reports about the companies in which the state has participation
will be given more credence if they are made by government officials
than when they are made by the foreign company's men.
It appears also that since the state began taking equity participa-
tion in the mining companies, greater local interest has been gener-
ated in their operations. The companies themselves have also be-
come more interested in local programmes such as education, sport,
and the like. Friedmann and Beguin suggest that there is an impor-
tant managerial advantage of a relatively intangible kind which
" FRIEDMANN AND BEGUIN. supra note 38, at 385.
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could result from this. They suggest that it has a favourable effect
on the morale of the local employees, since it is a major step in the
process of localisation by which a foreign investment assumes a local
character and status, which, when it is achieved, makes it easier for
the local employee to integrate his loyalties, with a consequent re-
duction in tension and improved work performance." '
C. Participation as a Disincentive to Investment
Some international mining companies dislike the requirement of
participation and try to avoid areas in which it is an established
policy. To this extent it is a disincentive to investment. It has been
cited as the reason why, for instance, low grade minerals of por-
phyries are being mined in the United States while exceptionally
fine deposits of the same minerals are being neglected in Chile and
Peru." Several reasons have been suggested by writers on foreign
investment for the companies' dislike of such requirements.
Friedmann and Beguin suggest that local participation can seri-
ously inhibit an internationally integrated company in its opera-
tions. What might otherwise be complete freedom to fix transfer
prices, marketing areas, and so forth, may be substantially circum-
scribed in the case of a joint venture with local equity participation.
And to some extent, political and psychological conditions militate
against joint ventures; when difficult and unstable conditions pre-
vail in a country, the association of a foreign investor with local
interests may increase the precariousness of the situation. 7
Yet perhaps the most widespread discouraging factor to a foreign
investor is what has been widely acknowledged to exist-the dispar-
ity of outlook between the foreign investor and the local partners.
In the business activities of developed countries, there is a certain
community not only of tradition but also of scientific, technical, and
legal standards, and there has also been more experience with re-
sponsible investment practices and legal supervision." In a country
like Zambia, this stage has not yet been reached. Power and wealth
are concentrated in relatively few hands, and are not matched by a
corresponding sense of responsibility. For instance, the partner from
an industrialised country, usually a large corporation with world-
'5 Id.
, Carman, Notes on Impediments to Mining Investment in the Developing World 14
BAGAUNDA PAPER (1975).
1 FRIEDMANN AND BExUvN, supra note 38, at 383.
I Id.
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wide experience, generally takes a long-term view of profits, placing
the development of the enterprise before quick dividends.
Some of the investors, it is stated, resent direct participation by
the government or a government-owned corporation in a capital-
importing country. 9 This is particularly so in American mining cir-
cles; there it is felt that there is something inherently unsuitable
about mixed government-private enterprises, since the government
"wears two hats" as regulator and partner. Others fear government
partnerships because they feel they would be subjecting themselves
to the dangers of frequent changes in government policy. But it
cannot be denied that in a country like Zambia the only alternative
to initial participation by government is no local participation at
all. There simply is no nongovernmental body big enough to form a
mining concern.
Some writers have suggested that the policy of requiring domestic
participation in foreign ventures is somewhat inconsistent with a
declared policy of attracting maximum foreign investment. The
government option, when exercised, utilises local capital that could
have financed alternative development and thus would have en-
hanced the development of other sectors of the economy.50 Further
it has been argued that the inconsistency between the two sets of
motives stands out sharply when it is realised that through govern-
ment participation outside investors may be forced to divest them-
selves of their equity to make room for local interests, resulting in
true disinvestment, with the foreign investor repatriating part of the
capital he would otherwise have used.
If this happened it would be unfortunate because this is capital
that would already have been attracted into the country. It is un-
likely to happen in Zambia, since section 20 of the Mines and Min-
erals Act ensures that prospecting licenses, the very first mining
rights, are granted to those who accept the principle of state partici-
pation should minerals be discovered.
It must also be realised, as has been demonstrated by the exam-
ples of the Lumwana and Mokambo licenfse areas, that the reverse
is equally possible-that is, that lack of government participation
may discourage some investors who do not want to take a greater
risk in searching for minerals and would prefer to share their risks
with the state.
'v Id.
NWOGUGU, supra note 40 at 13.
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The arguments also make a basic assumption that all mining
companies that start or wish to start a mining venture have ade-
quate financial resources to engage in such a venture. Mining being
an expensive and risky business, this is not always so. It is not
necessary to go further than Mkushi Mine, which closed after the
government refused its invitation to take equity participation, to
prove that not all mining companies have enough money to com-
plete their venture.
Even when they do have the money they may not be willing to
use it because of the size of the risk its use entails without govern-
ment participation. As observed earlier in the Lumwana license
area, for instance, the companies have indicated that they might
not have gone ahead without government equity participation. And
more recently, as pointed out earlier, Anglo-American Corporation
Ltd. has invited government participation in respect of its Munali
nickel prospect and has indicated that it might not go on if this is
not forthcoming.
It has been suggested that since the government, in the event of
its deciding to participate, would have to get its money from some
other source, it is open to question precisely what the state receives
for the percentage of the development costs that it subsidizes. Espe-
cially when the funds would readily have been provided by others,
the state's money would not be optimally allocated."
Where the government indemnifies the company for the total
amount spent on prospecting and exploration it still gains, it is
submitted. In the first instance, it cuts out the risk part and, sec-
ondly, the recoverable value of the mineral discovered will always
be far in excess of the prospecting and exploration expenses. In that
sense the money is optimally allocated. And as has already been
stated, money is not always readily available once a deposit has
been found.
The disincentive impact of government participation is nowadays
minimal since direct government participation in mining ventures
has spread among both developed 52 and developing mining coun-
1' Gordon, The Prospects for New Mine Investment, in ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND
ZAMBIAN COPPER: A CASE STUDY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 203 (M. Bostock & C. Harvey eds.
1972).
12 Britain is now, for instance, insisting on participation before issuing prospecting licenses.
The Guardian, May 28, 1976, at 1. Canada has government participation. See Drolet, Mining
Legislation and Responsible Authorities (paper presented at the International Symposium of
Technical Research in Mineralurgy and Management of Mineral Patrimony, Orleans-
Lasource, 1975) at 11.
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tries, so that its disincentive impact can no longer be as serious as
when its practice was limited. This is quite apart from the fact that
there are less and less alternatives available. In fact among develop-
ing countries recent demands for a new international economic
order have led to an ever increasing number of governments, in
these countries, demanding participation in the mining sector of
their economies.
Its disincentive impact is definitely not placed very high on the
list of disincentives by most mining right holders currently operat-
ing in the country. Several others are considered as more discourag-
ing-such as the threat of outright nationalisation at undefined
compensation levels, the political environment which may threaten
the validity of contracts or result in the imposition of onerous con-
trols, costs of services, legal complexities which make it difficult to
know what the law is, foreign exchange restrictions, taxation, and
the sheer magnitude of the investment required where the mine to
be brought into production is on a large scale.
It may be questioned whether it is wise at all to have any measure
which has the least prospect of discouraging any amount of much
needed capital. In the final analysis, the answer to this problem is
a question of balancing two evils. The cost of discouraging some
mining investment may not be too high a price to pay for the control
of the industry the government acquires, the direct government par-
ticipation in profits which results, and the consequent reaction in
stemming the outflow of profits. It is as important for Zambia to
attract mining investment as it is for her to regulate the repatriation
of profits which considerably reduce the investment resources in the
country and limit its positive effects within the country; this could
well be greater than the amount of investment discouraged.53 The
key to the government policy should be fair play with the private
sector over its term of participation to minimise the disincentive
effects of the policy.
IV. THE LEVEL OF EQUITY PARTICIPATION
As stated earlier, the state is at liberty to acquire any amount of
shares up to a maximum of 51% in any new mining venture. A
0 The organization of African Unity Conference of Heads of State at its 1973 meeting
recognised this problem and resolved among other things to defend vigorously, continually,
and jointly the African countries' inalienable sovereign rights and take concrete measures to
regulate the repatriation of profits which considerably reduce the investment resources of
African Countries. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, DECLARATION ON AFRICAN CO-OPERATION,
DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE (May 28, 1973).
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decision whether to take minority or majority shares in a venture
must depend on which of the two levels is more likely to reflect
effective control.
A. Minority Participation
The desire to make mining rights holders operate within the wider
terms of government's economic and social policy rather than in
their own narrower terms can be achieved to some extent by limited
participation of, say, 15% to 30% with two or three directors on the
board. But in reality this achieves little more that increasing the
information available to the state about the company. State-
appointed directors sitting in at board meetings receive reports and
schedules, but the real decisions continue to be made at the head
office of the parent company. Further than that it would only have
the advantage that state directors could ensure that a company
board was fully apprised of government's policies in respect to mat-
ters which came up for discussion.
Majority participation by a foreign company will entitle it to a
virtual power of veto in respect of a wide range of actions and deci-
sions of the joint venture, since its equity holding would entitle it
to a majority of the seats on the board. Several major corporate
actions would require the approval of the foreign firm, with the
result that the state would not have effective legal control of the
source of all executive functions of the mining company-the board
of directors-and over matters which it is necessary to have a say
in if government control of the industry is to be effective.
All decisions relating to finance, including the development of
new mines, would be subject to the majority veto. Thus, if the state
wanted the company to engage in further exploration which did not
appeal to the foreign partner, then it could not push forward its
views very forcefully. The area of finance and planning of capital
programmes of mining companies is one in which the state must
exercise some control or have the opportunity to exercise meaningful
control if any appreciable influence is to be exercised over the activi-
ties of mining companies in which it participates. For, as a United
Nations study on multinational companies has noted, even in the
most loosely knitted international firm, the minimal control or re-
striction which is exercised is control over the capital budget.54
" UNITED NATIONS, REPORT ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 46
(1976).
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Where the state participated only to the extent of less than 50%,
it would also not be in control of the general meeting. Under the
Companies Act of Zambia only three resolutions can be passed: a
simple resolution, an extraordinary resolution, and a special resolu-
tion. The first one requires a simple majority, and the other two
require much higher majorities in order for them to be passed.15 Free
voting at these meetings is out of the question in that in practice
only two people attend a general meeting of a joint venture, since
its members are the two holding companies of the equity participa-
tion.
Admittedly the same limitations apply to the foreign mining com-
panies, because with their equity participation they too may not be
in control of the board of directors when they take less than 50%,
and they cannot change any major areas of policy in a general meet-
ing without the consent of the state should it take an amount of
shares which makes it impossible to pass a resolution without its
cooperation. These limitations, however, are likely to hurt the gov-
ernment more than the private miner in that it is the government
that is interested in changing certain attitudes of the mining inves-
tors.
If the government is to have a chance of a real say in the decision-
making of a mining company in which it wishes to participate it
must acquire majority equity participation. This will then entitle it
to have half the directors, as in Mokambo Development Company
and Mindeco-Noranda, so that its directors on the board have a real
sanction to apply in terms of voting numbers. Zambia is insisting
on at least 51% participation, and there is at present no indication
that it will exercise its option in a mining venture for any share less
than this.
A large number of mining right holders hesitate to participate at
over 50% without a management agreement. This was the case in
the 1969 partial nationalisations of the then existing mines. The
experience of the state has been that these demands should be re-
sisted, as they go a long way towards negating government control
and influence on mining activities; indeed it has recently termi-
nated its previous management agreements.5 6
The control of the board of directors is not sufficient in itself. The
board does not run a company; its affairs are manned by executives,
55 Companies Act, Chapter 686 of the Laws of Zambia, §§ 12, 14, 15, 112.
' For the announcement cancelling the management agreements, see Times of Zambia,
August 31, 1973, at 1.
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who are charged with implementing the board's policies. It is there-
fore important to have some control over the executives. This in fact
sometimes explains why, although foreign investors are not con-
cerned with staffing of the operational levels and encourage local
staffing because of the political pressures in favour of localization
and the lower cost of local labour, they have a strong interest in
controlling decisions with regard to the staffing of the management
functions. It must be acknowledged, however, that it is also because
it is not easy to get expatriates on hire except on secondment and
management agreements.
It is preferable that the joint ventures should be self-managing.
The employment agreements could only be justified if there were
such a thing as the "neutrality" of management, i.e., management
systems were capable of universal application regardless of the
social-political context and the ideological basis of the economic
system. This, of course, is not the case. Management agents have
their own values and their judgments on policy matters are going
to be influenced by these values, and their employees owe their
loyalty to them.57
It may be argued that their recommendations are not imposed on
their principles and that their job is only to offer a possible solution
to the organisation. This argument assumes a technocratic board
capable of perceiving alternatives, which, as will be pointed out
later in this section, are lacking in Zambia. In addition, they are
extremely expensive, (sometimes deliberately so that their advice
will be regarded as preeminent) as they proved in the case of those
agreements concluded in 1969 between Anglo-American Corpora-
tion Ltd. and Roan Selection Trust Ltd. on the one hand and the
government of Zambia on the other.
5' R. SKLAR, CORPORATE PowER ltN AN AFRICAN STATE 203 (1975), quoted some mining execu-
tives of the Anglo-American Corporation as saying, "I feel as though I belong to the Company
more than any country," and "My first loyalty is to Anglo; Harry Oppenheimer sent me here
and there is something I can do for the group in this place."
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MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTANCY FEES PAID TO
ROAN SELECTION TRUST LTD. BY
ROAN CONSOLIDATED MINES LTD. 1970-1973 5s
Elements of Fees Fees Paid (Million Kwacha)
1970 1971 1972 1973
3/4% of sales proceeds 1.335 1.461 1.434 1.779
2% Consolidated Profits
before income tax but
after Mineral Tax 1.045 0.82 0.526 0.742
Total 2.380 2.221 1.960 2.521
This is disregarding the recruitment fee of 15% gross emoluments
of a recruit in the first year of duty, if in service not less than six
months.
The employees of management agents tend to stay for short peri-
ods of time and thus make those companies open to the criticism
that they frequently use developing countries as training ground for
young staff fresh out of business schools. There is some truth, too,
in the criticism that most expatriate employees, particularly at the
high levels, tend to be largely concerned with furthering their car-
eers with the foreign company that is employing them."
B. Factors Affecting Control
The distinction between majority and minority participation
may, of course, in certain circumstances be rather artificial, as eq-
uity alone, even when accompanied by joint management, can not
lead to effective control. Participation needs to be backed up by
government insistence on formalized planning and management
and a requirement that the board will be consulted on all major
matters. These techniques are designed to see that a company has
a policy clearly defined, after careful thought and consultation, for
each facet of its operation and that this policy is known throughout
Calculated from figures of gross sales and profits in the Company's Annual Reports.
5' For instance, since the termination of the management agreements the mines have
experienced a loss of senior staff. See Chairman's Report, Nchanga Consolidated Copper
Mines Ltd. (1975).
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the company and related to each employee's job. These techniques
are particularly relevant in that they will show up the areas in which
there is a conflict of interest between the partners and see that an
explicit policy is laid down to cover them. At the moment the exist-
ing joint ventures have a very poor working relationship with the
government. There are no accepted policy guidelines for state offi-
cials who have become members for instance.
The state must appoint directors and executives to represent it
on the board who are capable of looking after its interest. Its nomi-
nees must have a general knowledge of mining and of finance and
management in order that they can withstand any arguments from
their fellow directors from abroad when pressing for the carrying out
of government objectives such as localisation and reinvestment of
profits. The effectiveness the government-appointed directors can
exercise on a mining venture will depend on their being a capable,
alert, astute, and qualified team, so that, together with the foreign
directors, they can supervise the activities of management. Care
must be taken to see that people appointed to these posts under-
stand and sympathise with the government's objectives, for some
local people, because of their training, are very sympathetic to the
point of view of foreign companies."
The Zambian government is faring rather badly in this regard.
Owing to the relative youth of the country and the colonial neglect
of education, there is no local stock of retired executives on which
the government can draw to strengthen the technical knowledge of
the government side of these boards. The paucity of available tech-
nical management is also a result of the disproportion established
at the university level between the student population in technical
faculties and other faculties, and is reinforced by the high percen-
tage of failures in the technical faculties.
But the problem is more complex. Board appointments are
usually a contentious question, as political and other factors such
as ethnic considerations seem to play significant roles.6' Even in the
cases where reasonably able people have been given such positions
they have been transferred from company to company and also in
and out of companies far too often-frequently for political rather
than technical reasons. Several cases can be cited of managing
This is particularly so if they have been trained by one of the companies involved, as
such companies teach them how to approach problems from the company's own point of view.
11 Complaints by member of Parliament are frequent that appointments are made on
political grounds. Times of Zambia, January 28, 1976, at 1.
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directors being moved three times in a year, 2 with the result that
few of them have the opportunity to become familiar with their
management tasks or conversant with the industry and its difficul-
ties and consequently are rarely able to make rational judgments
based on time tested operations. Their difficulties are increased too,
by regular reorganisation of companies.
In one or two cases the government has appointed civil servants
to the boards of directors of some mining companies.13 In practice
this is unwise, because they simply do not have the time to do the
work effectively without sacrificing efficiency in their real jobs, and
this problem is exemplified by the fact that they are usually unable
to attend board meetings, being either on tour or busy in another
way.
All these factors combine to produce board members without the
necessary knowledge and ability. And the scarcity of available peo-
ple produces a situation in which it is common practice to find one
person being a member of several boards, many more than he can
cope with. In consequence his supervision and control diminishes
considerably, and his contribution becomes weak.
The need for directors who have mining experience can not be
over-emphasized. After all, management is largely a question of
decision, and decisions cannot be properly taken unless the mind is
clear about objectives and priorities. It is not being suggested that
a director need to possess a huge intellect to do his job properly.
What he needs far more urgently is a clear comprehension of what
he is aiming at-the object of the exercise from which he is able to
issue clear and unequivocal instructions because he is in no doubt
about the purpose of his management task. In a highly technological
industry like mining, there are very few management tasks that do
not call for a general understanding of technological operations.
C. Additional Measures towards Effective Control
Zambianisation is not only an important instrument in the trans-
fer of technology to one's nationals, it is also an important way of
increasing control over foreign ventures. Therefore the state should
ensure that it operates efficiently but reasonably. The well-
02 For instance, in Mines Industrial Development Corporation, the Managing Directorship
changed hands three times in 1975 alone.
0 See Mines Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., Directorate of 1974, and Roan
Consolidated Mines Ltd., Directorate of 1974. Both in MINES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPO-
RATION, [1974] ZAMBIA MINING YEAR BOOK.
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intentioned policy of Zambianisation can create management diffi-
culties which can endanger the performance of the industry where
haste results in people with little or no knowledge at all of the
operations they are supposed to manage being placed in manage-
ment positions.
Although it is the policy of the government to increase local em-
ployment, the measures employed to implement it do not seem to
be very effective. The main check on the rate at which the industry
is being localised is through the control on the immigration of expa-
triates. The Immigration Department will not grant any entry per-
mit to an expatriate unless the Ministry of Labour certifies that
there are no local citizens with the necessary qualifications and
experience to fill the job he is to take up and further, that adequate
steps have been taken to train local personnel. 4
The problem with this provision is that the Labour Ministry acts
mostly on the recommendations of senior mining officials who are
themselves expatriates, for, after all, only they are better placed to
judge on questions of qualifications and experience, as the local
people at the Ministry of Labour are unable to grasp fully the scope
and extent of the expertise that is required by the people to fill the
jobs.
The other check could be the application of a tax on expatriates,6 5
now applied to other categories of industry, to the mining industry.
But this may be unsuitable as it operates as a cost of production.
It is suggested that a measure additional to the one pertaining to
control of immigration could be taken. This could be done by creat-
ing a financial incentive to localisation of a different nature and one
which does not create the same problem as the one above, by provid-
ing that when a company has Zambianised to a given percentage-a
level to be determined by the educational standards of the coun-
try-it can deduct a fixed percentage of its net income free of taxes
to reinvest in the activities of its own firm or in other mining activi-
ties.
Foreign investors draw their special strength from their ability
and opportunity to think in terms that extend beyond any single
country and the use of resources that are located in more than one
jurisdiction," and sometimes try to end up making the largest profit
11 Immigration and Deportation Act, Chapter 122 of the Laws of Zambia, §§ 18, 19, and
20.
See Selective Employment Tax Act, No. 9, of 1975.
For detailed discussion of this, see R. VERNON, SOVERIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL
SPREAD OF UNITED STATES ENTERPRISES 265 (1971).
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in the lowest tax country by transfer of pricing. It is important to
start thinking in terms of devising measures which can assist in the
control of this phenomenon where it exists. This can be done by
regulations through which the state can get hold of the total ac-
counts of a company, to supplement the present limited regulations
in the Companies Act, which were originally devised for national
companies."
An example of what is suggested is the recent agreement among
the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development establishing a code of conduct among multinationals.
Among other things, the code outlaws transfer pricing methods and
requires multinational companies to give wide ranging information
about themselves including annual financial statements of profits
and sales, investments, numbers of employees on a geographical
basis, and the disclosure of a consolidated profit and loss account. 8
Although this can best be undertaken on an international basis a
start can be made with some measures on an individual basis.
In the final analysis, however, the ultimate source of power of
foreign companies is in their control over the process of technologi-
cal change." Even if Zambia purchased advanced machinery, it
may well find itself backward in a space of ten years. This is also
the primary vehicle, as observed earlier, for the acquisition of abnor-
mal profits where they exist. Companies keep this power by keeping
research and development at home. Zambian legislation should en-
courage foreign companies to conduct research in Zambia concern-
ing their projects. This could be done by creating incentives such
as exempting profits to be spent on research studies from any form
of taxation.70
67 Companies Act, Chapter 686 of the Laws of Zambia, §§ 120, 29, 90. All information
relates to a company's domestic activities.
The Guardian, June 22, 1976, at 14.
69 The problem of technology is discussed at length in Kapalinsky, Accumulation and the
Transfer of Technology: Issues of Conflict and Mechanisms for the Exercise of Control 80
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES DIscussiON PAPER (Sussex 1974).
I" A limited incentive exists, but one has to spend the money first, as it is allowed in
ascertaining the gains or profits of a business. See Income Tax Act, § 43.
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